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THE PROBLEM AND PROCEDURE FOLLOWED 
In all branches of learning there is a perennial need 
to check-up on material to determine if progress is being 
made and to note where a dead-end has been reached or actual 
retrogression has taken place. In no field is this check-up 
more ne~essary than in the field of theology and philosophy. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
Statement of the problem. The problem of this study 
has been to determine if Arminian theology in America, as 
represented by two of her most influential theologians, has 
been true to the philosophy and theology of John Wesley and, 
also, to determine if they have advanced this thought in any 
significant manner. More generally the problem of this study 
has been to delineate the main current of Wesleyan-Arminian 
theology. Randolph s. Foster and John Miley, consecutively 
professors of theology at Drew Theological Seminary in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, were chosen as 
representing the most influential school of Arminian theology 
in America. In this study, comparison has continually been 
made of the chosen American representatives with the three 
most influential British theologians, Wesley, Watson, and 
Pope. · 
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Justification of the study. The tragic confusion of 
contemporary theology, which is but a reflection of the 
confusion of contempora~y thought in general, has prompted 
this study. To return to bed-rock in philosophy and theology 
has been the urgent need of our generation. The reign of 
Kant and Hegel in philosophy came to an end in the last 
century. New leaders, such as Bergson and James, came to 
power with the beginning of the present century. These men 
were unable to occupy for long the place of authority. 
Bergson's two most promising students, Maritain and Gilson, 
turned Neo-Thomist and became its most brilliant contemporary 
representatives. At a time when the material logic of Hegel 
was all but dead in the field of pure philosophy it was very 
much alive in the fields of theology and the philosophy of 
history. Contemporary theology has been snowed under by an 
avalanche of authors who have been forcing theology through 
the forms of Hegelian dialectics. The theology of John 
Wesley, though it has escaped largely the dialectical plague, 
has suffered from severe corrosion, both of its philosophical 
basis and in its very vitals. 
Historical background. America has not had a 
reputation for great originality in its thinking. Even its 
political thought has been largely borrowed from Europe. 
Until recently its philosophy and theology also ca~e from 
Europe. Now one or two American philosophers have been 
3 
successful in starting the current flowing in the opposite 
direction. However, these currents came at too late a date 
to profoundly influence the thought of Europe. Theology, in 
the form of Calvinism 1 arrived first in America. Arminianism 
and Lutheranism came about a century and a half later. The 
Friends represented a Protestant group who were early 
residents in America, but their contribution was practice 
rather than theology. Philosophy, in the form of Locke's 
Essay, came to influence lonely thinkers like Jonathan 
Edwards, and Berkeley's personal visits were appreciated by 
the same lonely men. However, on the whole, the currents of 
philosophy flowing into America were not strong. Political 
thought and science, together with literature, were the chief 
intellectual supplies imported, aside from theology which 
constituted the main stream. By the time the new nation was 
established all three of Protestantism's great branches were 
facing each other and, unwilling to compromise in order to 
unite, were set to battle it out. Each of the three groups 
had an abundance of European theological thought ready at 
hand. The need was to bring this material into clear form 
and shape it for use in the close struggle that was to follow 
in the death grapple of theologies. 
It was only after the smoke of battle had somewhat 
subsided, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, that 
the greatest of these clarifying works appeared in all camps. 
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At this time the Calvinists were ably represented by Charles 
Hodge. Foster and Miley, representing the Arminians, pointed 
their arguments largely against Hodge. It is a point worthy 
of note that, at this same time, other works also appeared on 
eschatology, revision of the Scriptures, and exegesis. 
Joseph Seiss' monumental work on the Apocalypse represented 
the Lutheran group. Philip Schaff's labors, in heading the 
committee which produced the American Standard Version of the 
Bible, represented a united group. Daniel Steele's original 
work in the Greek Testament was an important contribution to 
Arminian theology. His studies strengthened the doctrine of 
entire sanctification, giving it the weight of sharper 
interpretation in passages which employed meaningful Greek 
verb tenses. 
Prior to the appearance of these great argumentative 
works, the work of evangelization had progressed across the 
continent, and the large major denominations had staked their 
claims, shaped their empires, and finished the rough pioneering 
work. It is important to note, that, just prior to the Civil 
War, great revivals swept the nation on a scale unprecedented 
before or since, so that at heart America was a profoundly 
Christian nation. The schools at that time were too few end 
too small to adequately educate America in the fine points of 
theology, yet the Bible was read there as well as in the 
homes and churches. The preachers, though largely self-
educated in the Arminian movement, read the basic works of 
their denomination, especially the early writers, such as 
Wesley and Fletcher, so that many of them had a profound· 
grasp of the cardinal doctrines of their theology. They 
preached doctrine to their people and thus grounded them in 
the important teachings of their church. The denominational 
disciplines were also rigidly followed in those early days. 
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After the Civil War the picture changed. The 
tremendous increase of wealth, due to the rapid industrial 
expansion, brought into American life the flood of secularism 
which all but destroyed vital Christianity. It was upon this 
secular stream that liberal theology rode into power. Foster 
and Miley witnessed the onrush of this current and felt its 
power. Perhaps it was more in recapitulation than in 
profound influence that the works of Foster and Miley stand, 
in their relation to Arminien thought in America. At any 
rate they furnish the clearest expression of that thought in 
America. The originality of a towering thinker like Jonathan 
Edwards, who stands as a lonely peak in American philosophy, 
cannot be claimed for Foster and Miley. The latter were 
clarifiers of thought already current in theology. However, 
even such thinkers can turn up new problems and supply new 
solutions. They emerged from a triumphant movement that had 
won success all over America and had become embodied in the 
largest single Protestant denomination. The Methodists won 
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their success not only by the zeal of their evangelism, but 
also by the quality of their theology. Even sons of 
established Calvinist families were won to Arminianism. 
Daniel Steele, the direct descendant of the father of David 
Brainerd, the prospective son-in-law of Jonathan Edwards, was 
an example of such a trophy. 
II. THE PROCEDURE FOLLOw'ED 
Limita.tions of the studi• This study has been limited 
to a few cardinal points of theology which have been the 
storm centers over which Arminian and Calvinist thought have 
fought their rounds. These are the subJects of anthropology 
and soteriology. Also included in this study have been the 
philosophical basis of theology, the relation of reason to 
revelation, e.nd the inspiration of the Scriptures. 
Comparison "t~Tith basic works. The procedure of this 
study has been to compare the contributions, on these topics, 
of Foster and Miley, 'tl'rhichever one was the stronger, with the 
basic works of Wesley, Watson, and Pope. The work of Foster 
has been used entirely on the philosophical basis of theology. 
Miley has been used entirely on the topics of anthropology 
and soteriology, with the exception of the sub-topic of 
entire sanctification, in the handling of which both men have 
been used. This study has used Locke's Essay of the Human 
Understanding to check Foster 1 s Prolegomena and Theism. 
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Miley, in developing his topics, made many references to the 
works of Wesley, Watson, and Pope. Thus the work of this part 
of the study became not a comparison but a check on Miley to 
determine if his conclusions were valid. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THEOLOGY 
The service of philosophy to theology has been an 
important one. The most influential theologians have colored 
for good or for evil their systems of theology by their 
philosophical commitments. 
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Luther's philosophical commitments. Lutherl had not 
been trained in the philosophy of Aristotle. He had little 
regard for any philosophy. The most influential minds in his 
background were those of Augustine and the German mystics, 
notably John Tauler. John Calvin2 also adhered closely to 
Augustine. Thus, Augustine became a dominant force in the 
theologies of both the Lutherans and the Calvinists. Neither 
Lutheran nor Calvinistic theology gave much place to the 
philosophical basis of theology. Neither Luther nor Ce~vin 
committed themselves to the logic and metaphysics of 
Aristotle. 
Wesley 8 s acceptance of Aristotle. That Wesley 
1 Julius Koestlin, "Martin Luther, n The New Schaff-
Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, VII~9-70. 
2 Benjamin B. Warfield, ncalvinism and Lutheranism, 11 
The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, II, 
360. 
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committed himself to the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle 
can be ·inferred from a reference which he made to Locke in 
the following quotation. 
In reading over the second volume of Mr. Locke's Essay 
I was much disappointed: it is by no means equal to the 
first. The more I consider it, the more convinced I was 
that his ~rand design was, (vain design!) to drive 
Aristotle s logic out of the world, which he hated 
cordially, but never understood: I suppose, because he 
had an unskillful master, and read bad books upon the 
subject.3 
It has been of interest to this writer to determine if 
Foster and Miley appreciated the Aristotelian background of 
Wesleyan theology. The early schools of America came from a 
Puritan background. Thus the oldest colleges were 
Calvinistic and did not teach Aristotelian philosophy. The 
study of philosophy came into American Protestant schools at 
a much later date. 
II. FOSTER 1 S PROLEGOMENA AND THEISM 
Foster's debt to Locke. In the Prolegomena Foster 
made several references to Locke's Essay. The influence of 
this book is evident throughout the Prolegomena. It has 
seemed important to review fragments of the Essay, pertinent 
portions which deal most directly with the problems treated 
in the Prolegomena. 
Locke's Essay has influenced several outstanding 
3 John Wesley, Works (New York: J. Emory and B. Waugh, 
lg31) I VII, p. 44g. 
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theologians. Wesley had a high regard for Locke, correcting 
him principally where he departed from the logic and 
metaphysics of Aristotle. Jonathan Edwards, who had access 
to few books, early became acquainted with Locke and prized 
him highly, but in his mature thinking he accepted Leibnitz 1 
corrections on Locke. Leibnitz, as he himself confessed, 
stood in relation to Locke somewhat as Plato had stood in 
relation to Aristotle. Edwards, largely self-educated in 
philosophy, was never led to see the basic importance of 
Aristotle. 
In the opinion of Wesley, Locke nowhere in his Essay 
showed himself more masterful than in Book One, in which he 
refuted arguments for the innateness of ideas and principles. 
This work of clearing the ground of all debris, in order that 
the structure of knowledge might arise upon a clean foundation, 
was, to Wesley, an important accomplishment. Wesley wrote: 
I think that point, that we have no innate principles 
is abundantly proved, and cleared from all objects that 
have any shadow of strength, and it was highly needful to 
prove the point at large, as all that follows rests on 
this foundation; and as it was at that time an utter 
paradox both in the philosophical and the religious world.4 
Foster leaned heavily upon Locke. He took over from 
Locke the notion that, to begin with, the mind is void of 
ideas--a mere tabula ~· Like Locke,5 he differentiated 
4 Ibid. I p. 445. 
5 John Locke, An Essay Concerning the Human Understanding 
(London: George Routledge and Sons Limited cn.d. 3 ), pp. 491 ff. 
truth: (1) truth of being, (2) truth of concept (mental 
truth), (3) truth of sign (verbal truth), (4) moral truth. 
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A notable differentiation in the thought of Foster and 
Locke was that of idea and concept. Idea, to Locke,6 was 
anything that comprised the content of the mind. He did not 
use the notion of concepts. To Foster, the ideas was 
primarily that which existed in the mind of God prior to man's 
creation and served as the archetype for his creation.7 When 
a concept corresponds with the idea completely it becomes 
identified with an idea. 
Unlike Locke, who constructed his structure of 
knowledge on the foundation of simple ideas, Foster took 
concepts ready at hand and proceeded from there. A 
thoroughgoing philosophical basis to the sciences must be 
constructed upon the bedrock of some sort of simples. In his 
Prolegomen~ Foster posited the existence of God as the basic 
stone in the foundation of theology. However, in that book, 
he did not attempt to establish the philosophical ground upon 
which the proof of God's existence rests. This was preserved 
for his Theism. To Foster, the crux of the whole problem of 
demonstrating the existence of God lay in being able to show 
that the changes in matter clearly show an extra-mat erial 
-' 6 !bid.~;-pp. 4-5. 
7 Randolph S. Foster, Prolegomena (vol. I, Randolph s. 
Foster, editor, S~udies in Theology, 4 vols.; New York: Hunt 
and Eaton, 1890-1895), pp. 62 ff. 
g cause. This required an ability of mind to clearly grasp 
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what is involved in the notion of causality. Foster posited 
the notion that the mind could arrive at a clear conception 
of causality though it could not grasp what was involved in 
such a notion.9 For example, though man knows that a first 
cause brought the world into being he does not know the 
manner in 'JArhich it was brought into being. This assumption 
by Foster we.s purely fl metaphysical one. It was based on the 
necessity of the mind in thinking about reality.lO Hume 1 s 
sequence of events, which ha.d been posited to take the place 
of causation, Foster rejected as being 11 wretched cavil.nll 
The principle of causality was, for Foster, necessary 
to the life of reason. The mind in its thinking about 
reality, to avoid intellectual suicide, must recognize the 
validity of this principle. Once the principle of causality 
is recognized the mind is driven to recognize that matter 
cannot initiate action. The mind is able to have clear 
notions of the distinction between mind and matter. The mind 
is able to see deeper than the phenomena of nature and is 
able to recognize that there is a power behind nature. The 
... uS Randolph s. Foster, Theism { vol. II, Randolph s. 
Foster, editor, Studies in Theologl, 4 vole.; New York: Hunt 
and Eaton, 1g90-1S95) , p. 90. 
9 Ibid. I p. 91. 
10 Ibid., p. 90. 
11 Ibid. I p. g4. 
mind of man does not rest until it arrives at an ultimate 
cause of s~l things.l2 
To Foster, the demonstration of God 1 s existence had 
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metaphysical roots which were imbedded in the life of reason 
in such a manner that they could not be removed without 
destroying that life. 
Foster's ~resupposition~. The basic presuppositions 
of Foster13 were that the mind inevitably and by necessity 
forms concepts both of itself and o~ other beings. From the 
process of forming these concepts emerges such postulates as 
that mind exists and hence there is an ego, that there is 
objective reality, that concepts exist, and that there is an 
exact correspondence between the concept and the objective 
reality. Foster did not attempt to give reasons for positing 
his presuppositions but simply took them as basic without 
needing validation. He assumed their necessity in beginning 
any sort of intellectual pursuit. He dogmatically asserted 
such notions as: (l} there is an external, concrete universe; 
(2) there are minds; (3) the external concrete does become an 
object of thought by or to mind or minds.l4 Foster by-passed 
the skeptical approach and simply took for granted the 
presuppositions of enquiry. No attempt was made by Foster to 
. 12 Ibid., p. 1S5. 
13 Foster, Prolegomen~, p. 54. 
answer the skepticism of Hume; in fact, the Prolegomen~ makes 
no reference to Hume. With the statements of his 
presuppositions, Foster proceeded to build his structure of 
knowledge. 
Foster's epistemolo~. The mind though starting with 
sensations quickly transcends them and rises into the realm 
of super-sensible ideas. 1 5 Following Locke closely, Foster 
briefly described the acquistion of such ideas as those of 
space, time, and power.16 The Christian epistemology, 
according to Foster, postulates the existence of ideas before 
things. He wrote: 
In tracing the history of the human idea, we found that 
concrete reality is antecedent to the concept, and its 
synthesis with mind, the ground of the concept. The 
world of human concepts is offspring of the world of 
realities, and a transcript of them in thought. 
But now when we turn to the world of realities, to 
examine them, we find that the case is reversed: the 
realities are transcripts of pre-existing ideas--the idea 
is older than the reality. As we push investigation, we 
discover that the concrete universe falls within the 
limits of time--that once it was non-existent. But we 
know that had there been no reality or being of any kind, 
then no being could ever have existed, as that would 
involve the coming of all reality from the empty womb of 
nothing, in contradiction of the axiom intuitively 
perceived to be a necessary truth, ~ nihilo nihil !!1, 
or, more generally formulated, there can be no effect 
without a cause. 
But now, when continuing the investigation, we pass 
out beyond all objective reality--that is, all dependent 
15 Ibid., p. 6o. 
16 ~• 1 P• 61. 
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being, or being originating in time, and come to that 
antecedent, independent, eternal reality, the then only 
form of being, we are compelled to conceive it as 
possessing the idea of the as yet non-existing universe, 
as it is impossible it should give concreteness to ideas 
which it did not possess. Thus idea in its original form 
is seen to be, not a concept of reelity propagated by it 
in mind 1 but·' on the contrary 1 it is found to be the 
eternal mold into which reality is cast. The universe of 
real things is made after the image or pattern of the 
invisible things--eternal ideas. It is that which makes 
the universe intelligible, or translatable into thought. 
The unmeaning cannot be explained. That which does not7 express thought cannot be put in the terms of thought.l 
This primacy of the idea is not Platonic because it has no 
real being but is in the mind of God. 
·Foster did not mean to say that the concept is 
propagated in the perceiving mind by the external concrete, 
or that the mind is a passive recipient of the image of the 
reality, as is a mirror, but that the object when presented 
to the mind in sensation becomes the occasion or ground of a 
mental act by which is formed a concept of the reality. The 
archetypal idea to Foster was that which antedated the 
concrete reality. He explained again the order of ideas and 
things. 
The historic order is: first, an eternal mind, the one 
only reality, holding in idea a universe not yet existing; 
second, a creative act, by which a universe of objective, 
concrete being was fs.shioned after the pattern of 
antecedent ideas. Subsequent to that creative act there 
were and are two kinds of being--one, the uncreated, 
independent, which anterior to the creation was the only 
being; the other, a created form of being, which, prior 
to the creative act, had no existence except as a thought, 
but which, by the creative act, became a reality and not 
a thought; third, created mind--a real being or beings 
introduced into existence long posterior to the creation 
of things, which, by a ppwer invested in them, is able to 
see the antecedent things a.s they are in reality--things 
expressing ideas. The three kinds of being are distinct 
and real, and separable in thought: the first, eternal, 
spiritual; the second, temporal, material; the third, 
temporal, spiritual; the second and third dependent on 
and caused by the first; the second in no sense dependent 
on or caused by the third; the third not caused by the 
second but served by it; the first and the third of the 
same nature, but different as infinite and finite; the 
second wholly differentiable in nature from the first and 
third. In the first, idea is archetype; in the second, 
idea is concrete; in the third, idea is derivative.l5 
Knowledge distinguished ~ belief. Locke's 
definition of knowledge was brief 1 being the "perception of 
the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, 
of any of our ideas."l9 This implied certainty. According 
to Foster, knowledge implies three things: (1) firm belief; 
(2) of what is true (3) on sufficient grounds.20 The 
pertinent part of the definition is the last phrase. The 
grounds, according to Locke, must be such as to give 
certainty, not just assurance or probability. Intuition gives 
certainty. 11 All knowledge is in the last resort, intuition.tt21 
The knowing process involves intuition. Only intuition, which 
immediately perceives the agreement or disagreement of ideas, 
lS Ibid., p. 69. 
19 Locke, QQ. cit., p. 424. 
20 ~·~ p. 12S. 
21 Ibid., pp. 434-36. 
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yields knowledge. However, according to Locke22 the process 
of demonstrative proof yields knowledge because in each step 
intuition is used so that the valid conclusions of such a 
process yield certainty though of a slightly inferior quality 
to simple intuition--as if there could be degrees of certainty! 
Foster 1 s list of what is known squared with Locke 1 s 
view--with one exception. 
We know objects external to self by perception when in 
suitable relations to them [falling under category of 
sensitive knowledge of particular existence in Locke 8 s 
wording]. 
We know things and events of the past by memory 
[retention of what has been known]. 
We know things and events by testimony [this to Locke 
constituted probability and not knowledge except in the 
case of the testimony of a Divine personality. Very 
substantial testimony brings such high probability as to 
excite a high degree of assurance]. 
We know some necessary truths (axiomatic truths]. 
We know demonstrated truths.23 
Locke made a remarkable admission in favor of Divine 
Revelation because he regarded the testimony of a Divine 
Being as constituting the highest type of knowledge. 
Besides those we have hitherto mentioned, there is one 
sort of propositions that challenge the highest degree of 
our assent, upon bare testimony, whether the thing 
proposed agree or disagree with the common experience and 
the ordinary course of things or no. The reason where of 
is, because the testimony is of such an one that cannot 
deceive nor be deceived, and that is of God himself. 
22 Foster,~· cit., p. 69. 
23 Ibid., p. 182. 
This carries with it assurance beyond doubt, evidence 
beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name 
1revelation, 11 and our assent to it, 1faith 1 ; which as 
absolutely determines our minds and as perfectly excludes 
all wavering, as our knowledge itself; and we may as well 
doubt of our own being as we can whether any revelation 
from God be true. So that faith is a settled and sure 
principle of assent and assurance, end leaves no manner 
of room for doubt or hesitation. Only we must be sure that 
it be a divine revelation, and that we understand it right: 
else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of 
enthusiasm and all the error of wrong principles, if we 
have faith and assurance in what is not divine revelation. 
And therefore, in those cases, our assent can be 
rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a 
revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on 
probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an 
assurance of diffidence, arising from the more or less 
apparent probability of the proofs. But of faith and the 
precedency it ought to have before other arguments of 
persuasion 1 I shall speak more hereafter, where I tree.t 
of it as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to 
reason, though, in truth, it be nothi~ij else but an 
assent founded on the highest reason. 
Foster, in the many pages which he devoted to the 
subject, said no more than what Locke thus said so concisely 
and so well. 
How shall we determine which of our concepts are 
knowledge, which beliefs, and which mere unfounded fancies? 
This was a leading question to Foster. The problem of the 
relation of belief to knowledge occupied a large a.'llare of 
the concern of the Prolegomena. There are certain common 
points belonging to all of the three--knowledge, belief, and 
fancy. They all alike imply the presence in the mind of 
' defined conceptions. They all imply a degree of conviction 
2~ Locke, SQ· £11., p. 566. 
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that the concept represents some truth, expresses an 
affirming act or state of the mind with respect to the 
concept, or the object which it represents.25 Here Foster 
follows Locke in regarding knowledge as involving certainty. 
Wnere there is certain knowledge there is no need for belief. 
Belief and fancy involve uncertainty. Mere feeling of 
certainty alone is not sufficient ground for discriminating 
knowledge from belief. When knowledge of a thing is affirmed 
there is no possibility that this knowledge should turn out 
to be false. A belief may not square with the truth but 
knowledge must or it no longer is knowledge. 
Foster regarded a clear understanding of the relation 
of belief to knowledge to be of prime importance to theology. 
Belief without antecedent knowledge is blind credulity. 
Belief must rest upon a foundation of knowledge. In the work 
of theologians like Charles Hodge this distinction between 
belief and knowledge is not made too clearly. 
Knowledge is the perception of truth. Whatever the 
mind perceives, whether intuitively or discursively, to 
be true, that it knows. We have immediate knowledge of all 
the facts of consciousness; and with regard to other 
matters, some we can demonstrate, some we can prove 
analogically, some we must admit or involve ourselves in 
contradictions and absurdities. Whatever process the 
mind may institute, if it arrives at a clear perception 
that a thing is, then that thing is an object of 
knowledge. It is thus that we know the objects with which 
heaven and earth are crowded. It is thus we know our 
fellow men. With regard to anything without us, when our 
ideas or convictions concerning it correspond to what the 
25 P"o st er, .2l2.· ill· , p. 71+. 
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thing really is then we know it. How do we know that our 
dearest friend has a soul, and that that soul has 
intelligence, moral excellence, and power? We cannot see 
or feel it. We cannot form a mental image of it. It is 
mysterious and incomprehensible, yet we know that it is, 
and what it is, just as certainly as we know that we 
ourselves are, and what we are. In the same way we know 
tbat God is, and what he is. We know that he is a spirit, 
that he has intelligence, moral excellence and power to 
an infinite degree. We know that he can love, pity, and 
pardon--that he can hear and answer prayer. We know God 
in the same sense, and just as certainlyJ as we knot'V' our 
father and mother. And no man can take this knowledge 
from us, or persuade us that it is not knowledge, but a 
mere irrational belief.2° 
Foster remarked after quoting the above statement from 
Hodge that he thought it was open to serious objections. 
However, he did not give his objections specifically but 
continued to differentiate between the acts of knowing and 
believing. He listed the following differences. (1) It is 
not in the fact that the object is more clearly before the 
mind in the one case than in the other. There is no doubt 
that matters of belief are genera.lly more indistinct thEm 
matters of knowledge; but this is not necessarily so. A 
proposition may be as unequivocal as any reality. (2) It is 
not in the fact that the mind is more conscious of doubt or 
uncertainty in the one case than in the other. There is no 
question that doubt and uncertainty more or less attaches to 
beliefs, and that they neither can nor do exist in regard to 
knowledge; but a belief may and often does exclude all doubt. 
(3) It is not in the fact that what is kno~m is true, and 
26 It>id., PP· 7S-79· 
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what is believed is not true. It is a fact that what is 
believed is not always true, and what is known always is, but, 
since some things believed are true, the difference is not in 
that which may be, and sometimes is, common to both states. 
(4) It does not consist in that; what is known is important, 
and what is believed is not important. 
The difference is found in the following points. 
(1) The mind is differently related to the objects of 
knowledge and belief. This difference of relation makes 
knowledge a necessary fact in one case and not in another. 
(2) Things known are necessarily true as known; things 
believed may not be true. (3) Things known may not be 
doubted; things believed may be brought to doubt. 
(4) Knowledge cannot be changed into belief; belief may pass 
into knowledge. (5) There is no difference in the certainty 
which attends knowledge; there is difference in the certainty 
which attends belief. 27 
In comparing the statement of Hodge with the 
distinctions made by Foster and checking both by Locke it has 
been, in some degree, possible to ascertain how clearly 
Foster was able to distinguish between the acts of knowing 
and believing. The whole business of knowledge and belief is 
more complicated than differentiating between the terms of 
knowledge and belief. As Foster said, any child knows the 
27 Ibid., pp. 80-Sl. 
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difference between believing and knowing. This, however, has 
reference only to the difference between the terms. 
Foster had no quarrel with what was affirmed by Hodge, 
but he did take issue with the manner in which it was 
asserted. A clear perception of truth is knowledge; there is 
no argument here but the great burden of the problem of 
knowledge is how it can be established that what is perceived 
does correspond with reality. Clarity, of perception, as 
Locke pointed outfg is not determined by the intensity of 
feeling associated with the conviction. The entire realm of 
beliefs, whether of natural things or what is supernaturally 
revealed, must undergo a thoroughly rational test. Nothing 
must be believed that does not carry with it credentials 
giving reason for such a belief. When credentials associated 
with beliefs are so strong as to remove all doubt knowledge 
has been reached. 
The relation 2! reason 12 revelation. The problem of 
the relation of reason to revelation until recently was quite 
a settled problem in theology, almost as settled as the 
doctrine of the Trinity. However, in recent years, due to 
the great dust stirred up by the dialectical theologians, it 
has again become a pertinent issue of discussion. This is an 
instance not of a healthy ferment, preceding growth in a 
2g Locke, QR• £!!., p. 591. 
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field of knowledge 1 but is rather a sign revealing the decay 
existing in a large strata of contemporary philosophy. 
On the relation of reason to revelation Hodge and 
Foster saw eye to eye. Hodge wrote clearly and forcibly upon 
the subject.29 He admonished that Christians in repudiating 
rationalism in all its forms do not throw out reason in 
matters of religion. ~ney acknowledge its high place and the 
responsibility falling upon them to use it. First of all 
reason is necessarily presupposed in every revelation. 
Revelation is a communication of truth to the human mind. 
The notion of communication of truth supposes the capacity to 
receive it. Revelation has nothing to communicate to brutes. 
Truths, to be received as objects of faith, must be 
intellectually apprehended. A proposition with no meaning, no 
matter how important the truth which it may conceal, cannot 
be an object of faith. If it be affirmed that the soul is 
immortal, or that God is a spirit, unless we grasp the meaning 
of the terms nothing is communicated to the mind. Knowledge 
is essential to faith. Nothing can be affirmed of that which 
is not known. The first task of reason is to grasp the 
truths proposed for our reception. 
To Hodge it was important to bear in mind the 
difference between knowing and understanding. A child can 
know that God is a spirit, know what the terms imply but no 
29 Foster, QQ. £11., pp. 264 ff. 
created mind can fully comprehend the Almighty. It is 
possible to know the plan of salvation but at the same time 
be unable to comprehend the mysteries involved. Generally 
men know much more than they understand. God does not require 
of His creatures that they believe without knowledge. Such a 
thing would not only be irrational but also impossible. 
It is the prerogative of reason to judge of the 
credibility of revelation. However, what is creditable to 
one mind may be incredible to another. To judge too narrowly 
of what is credible is intellectual suicide. Unless one is 
willing to believe things that are incomprehensible one 1 s 
beliefs will be so limited as to restrict their mind to 
darkness. Extreme skepticism drives out knowledge completely. 
All that is left for the mind is to posit its beliefs and for 
these beliefs there is no objective standard by which they may 
be judged. 
There is a difference between what is incomprehensible 
and what is impossible. The impossible cannot be maintained 
as a true belief. The statement of Tertullian to the effect 
that he believed because it is absurd is nonsense. God no 
more requires men to believe what is absurd than to do what 
is wrong. There is a distinction between belief and faith. 
Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is 
true. It is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm 
that to be true which it sees cannot possibly be true. As it 
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is impossible for God to contradict Himself, so it is impossible 
that He should, by an external revelation, declare that to be 
true which from a law of nature He has rendered it impossible 
for men to believe. 
Scripture itself appeals to reason. The high ground of 
faith and knowledge is confidence in God. With the denial of 
reason would disappear all distinction between truth and 
falsehood, between right and wrong. 
The cardinal service of reason is as a judge of the 
evidences which support a revelation. Faith without evidence 
is irrational. Evidences consist in different varieties. 
Historical truth requires historical evidence; empirical 
truth, the testimony of experience; mathematical truth, 
demonstration; moral truth, moral evidence; a.nd the things of 
the Spirit, the demonstration of the Spirit. 
To Foster the approach to revelation was thoroughly 
rational. 
The final and supreme arbiter in every case as to what 
is truth, is the mind itself. It may mistake, but it must 
abide its own verdicts. It is its function to decide for 
itself. The ground of the decision, when it acts truly, 
according to its nature, must be satisfactory evidence. 
It can never be required to act otherwise. It is sole 
and supreme umpire. It must decide what to accept and 
what to reject. It is responsible for the decision. 
There may be a case when it cannot decide which of 
several alternatives ought to be believed--that is which 
is true. There may be sufficient evidence in its 
possession, and none within its reach by any search 
possible to it. In that case it remains undecided. Thus 
it appears that while it may 1 by the right use of the 
faculties, conclude from evidence what should be believed 
or not believed in a given case, and while it is itself 
alone responsible in that case for its decision, there 
are cases which do not come within range of its faculties, 
with respect to which it has no power except by self abuse 
to have any belief, and with respect to which 1 therefore 1 
it has a responsibility to withhold fa,ith. Non-faith is 
then its true attitude; not disbelief nor yet belief.30 
The reason decides on the evidences. The mind is 
obliged to believe just what the evidences prove. Further 
the mind is obliged to actively pursue truth, to hunt 
evidences in order to reach a just conclusion. The mind must 
know what constitutes evidence.31 
Not only is the reason employed in dealing \<lith 
evidences but also it is used in determining the meaning of 
the contents of Scripture. Foster posited two rules for 
Biblical interpretation. (1) No idea can be contained which 
is not according to truth, and hence, that no idea can be 
contained which is contradictory of some known truth, or 
which is contradictory in itself. (2) Ideas cannot be found 
in the book which are subversive and contradictory of each 
other.32 
The reason maintains the right to judge whether a 
passage in Scripture is authentic or not. If there should be 
an absolute conflict between reason and any purported 
revelation the verdict of reason is supreme. 
30 Ibid., p. 269. 
31 Loc. ill· 
32 ~- 1 P• 272e 
Inspiration of the .§criptures. Foster held very 
liberal views regarding the inspiration of the Scriptures. 
To him the Bible need not be inspired in all its parts. To 
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claim inspiration for the whole Bible was to make a needless 
assertion. All that is needed is to claim that the Bible is 
true. Untruth is the only thing which could put it in peril. 
The fact that Christ and the other New Testament writers 
recognized the authority of the Old Testament need not mean 
that they considered it as all inspired but simply that they 
regarded it e"s all true. Foster made his o\>m peculiar 
distinctions between revelation and inspiration. The Bible, 
to him, was a revelation insofar as it is a self-manifestation 
of God, or a medium of God 1 s disclosure of himself. 
Inspiration to Foster v.Jas an extraordinary influence exerted 
by the Spirit of God on the mind of the writer so that 
feelings and thoughts were directly imparted. To Foster 
there might be the possibility of other methods of revelation 
besides inspiration. Revelation has many incidents. The 
creation was a revelation. Likewise, the order of nature, the 
incarnation of the deity in human form, the miracles, the 
Bible itself are all revelations. The Bible could be a 
revelation without being inspired. 
Let us look at the case in a common-sense way, and see 
what conclusion must force itself upon us either as 
necessary or the most rational. Here is a book of so many 
pages, words, letters, and punctuation points. By all it 
is conceded that it was written by a certain number of 
men at different periods of time; but a question is 
started as to whether the men wrote as amanuenses or 
original authors. Now, if the book is true, it can, in 
fact, make no difference as to its intrinsic value how 
that question is answered since the answer one way or 
another can put nothing in the book that was not there 
before and can make the truth no more than true--no more 
important. Still, as a question of fact, it remains, 
were the writers amanuenses? How shall we answer that 
question? Ha.ve they said anything about it themselves? 
Does the book contain the answer? If the book be simply 
true, and if it makes a deliverance on the point, that 
would settle the case. Everything would turn on the 
question of the truthfulness of the book. Thus the 
question of truth of contents is again the question of 
ultimate importance. There are three v
3
1ews competing for 
acceptance, one of which must be true. 3 
This quotation has served as a basis for judging 
Foster• s position on the inspiration of the Scriptures. The 
three views which he referred to were: (1) the plenary verbal 
view--each word was given to the writers from God; (2) the 
superintendence view--the Holy Spirit guided the writers in 
the selection and insured against error; (3) the view that 
the writings were to a large extent human recor4s containing 
a truthful account, with many inspired portions delivered 
directly to the holy men.34 This last view corresponded with 
Foster's notion of inspiration. 
It has been impossible in this study to determine how 
Foster derived such a liberal view of the inspira.tion of the 
Scriptures. In a quotation used in this study, Foster wrote 
that the Word itself said nothing about whether or not the 
33 Ibid. I pp. 2gl-g2. 
34 Ibid., p. 2g2. 
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writers were amanuenses. The Bible said nothing whatever 
about the mode of inspiration, it simply stated that 11 all 
Scripture is given by inspiration of God.n35 Peter referred 
to the holy men of God who spoke as they were moved by the 
Holy Ghost.36 There are other simple references in the Bible, 
such as in the book of Revelation,37 where the writers were 
commanded to write. The Holy Spirit communed directly with 
the writers to command them to write and to instruct them in 
what to write.3g There are several references in the Bible 
to the Divine origin of the Scriptures.39 The hundred and 
nineteenth Psalm alone is full of references to the Word, the 
statutes of God, and the law of God. Though nothing has been 
given in the Bible concerning the mode of inspiration it is 
full of references to the Word of God as being sacred, as 
being inspired of God in its entirety. All of Scripture is 
sacred and composes a unit ~1ich in all translations has been 
designated the Holy Bible. It is not only all true but all of 
it has been put together under the guidance of the Holy Spirit 
~. English. 1611. Authorized., The Hol~ Bible (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons ~n.d.3 ), II Timothy 3:1 • 
36 A.V., II Peter 1:21. 
37 A.V., Revelation 1:11; Jeremiah 30:1. 
3g A.V., Acts 1:16; Hebrews 3:7; Luke 16:31; Romans 3:2; 
H ebrel*lS 1:1. 
39 A. V. 1 Psalms 119:9. 
for a special purpose.4o It is impossible to be acquainted 
with the Bible and not be profoundly impressed by this work 
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of the Holy Spirit. One has only to read the Apocryphal books 
to realize that nothing but Divinely inbreathed literature 
can hold its place between the covers of the Holy Bible. 
What is only human cannot even guarantee that it is a hundred 
percent true. Truth involves not only an accurate account of 
statistics but also accurate judgments. The only explanation 
that can be made for Foster 1 s liberal view of the inspiration 
of the Scriptures is that he chose a purely rational approach. 
Even so it is difficult to see how reason could arrive at such 
a conclusion. According to reason it would not be necessary 
for any portion of the Bible to be inspired if it were all 
true. 
The Holy Spirit could have communed with the Holy men 
of God, the ten commandments could have been given, Moses 
could have delivered his addresses, the covenant could have 
been made with Abraham, Christ could have come, died and been 
raised from the dead, and all these things could have been 
truthfully recorded by contemporary witnesses. However, 
without the complete superintendence of the Holy Spirit they 
could never have composed the present unit. The liberal view 
of Foster stands without defense. 
Miley accepted the fact of the agency of the Holy 
~0 A:~ II Timothy 3:16. 
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Spirit in the authorship of the Scriptures.. Rather than a. 
rational approach to the subject he took the approach of what 
Scripture says about itself. Miley distinguished between 
inspiration and revelation. Inspiration was to him 11 a mode 
of divine agency in the communication of religious truth, and 
that such truth is the product of the inspiration.n41 On 
revelation Miley wrote: 
Now, if we restrict revelation to the literal sense of 
the term, that is, a disclosure of unknown truths, and as 
here meaning such truths of religion as we receive only 
through the Scriptures, the same distinction between 
inspiration and revelation fully remains; and such is the 
only true distinction. But there may be a revelation 
through some other mode of the divine agency, as for 
instance the oral teaching of our Lord; and in such case 
there must be the sa~e distinc4~on between such agency 
and revelation as the product. 
Miley differentiated a three-fold operation of the 
Spirit: (1) Illumination of the mediate agent; (2) Communication 
of the truth; (3) Agency in publication. 43 In the illumination 
of the agent the operation is similar to 't<Ihen Christ opened 
the mind of his disciples so that they could understand the 
Scriptures. In the communication of truth the Holy Spirit 
directly communicates truths to the agent. The third, the 
agency in the publication, is itself concerned with the proper 
~Miley, Systemati£ Theology, Vol. 2 (George R. 
Crooks and John F. Hurst, editors, LibrarJ[ of Biblical an£ 
Theolo~ical Literature, 9 vols.; New York: Eaton and Mains, 
H~7S-l 99} I p. lf"19-:- ·-
42 Loc. ill· 
43 Ib!£· I pp. 4gl-g2. 
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expression of the truth. Not in all Scripture were all three 
agencies required. While there is a place for inspiration in 
all Scripture, the threefold offices of the Spirit were 
necessary only with respect to their higher truths. 
CHAPTER III 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF NATIVE DEPRAVITY 
a doctrinal formula for the expression and characterization 
of native sinfulness. The doctrine of original sin became a 
prominent subject with Augustine though it was a topic of 
theological study prior to his time.l In the Augustinian 
anthropology, original sin included a common guilt of Adam 1 s 
sin, a common native depravity, and a. sinfulness which 
deserved both temporal and eternal punis~~ent. According to 
Augustinian anthropology native depravity is, in itself, a 
punishment inflicted upon all men for their share in Adam's 
guilt. Miley felt that there was no necessity in treating 
native depravity, guilt, demerit, and penalty as all one 
problem but that they should be segregated and studied 
separately. 2 
Definition of 1~ used. Depravity is not a physical 
entity or any form of essential existence but is a moral 
condition. In its purely metaphysical form it is not easily 
-- 1 John Miley, S;y:stematic .TI.!.~~~g;y:, Vol. l (George R. 
Crooks and John F. Hurst 1 editors, Libra.:tl .Q1 Biblical and 
Theological Literature, 9 vols.; New York: Eaton and Mains, 
1878:1899), p:-~1. 
2 Ibid. I p. 442. 
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grasped in thought.3 Depravity has no real being but it is a 
mode of the moral nature which belongs to real being. 
Depravity is not restricted to the will though the will is 
profoundly affected, not only directly but also indirectly, 
through the depraved sensibilities which influence the will. 
Inordinate feelings, vicious impulses, evil tendencies arise 
from a disordered state of the sensuous nature. These are 
the "lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the 
pride of life.n The moral nature itself is disordered. The 
moral reason may become darkened and the conscience por.-ierless. 
Depravity is located in both the sensuous and the moral 
nature, constituting filthiness of both the flesh and the 
spirit. 
The modes of transmission. The origin of depravity 
never has been disputed by ev~Smgelical theologians. By them 
the sin of Adam is attributed as the originating cause of 
depravity. The law of Adamic origin has two theories: 
(l) the theory of penal retribution; and (2} the theory of 
genetic transmission of depravity. The theory of penal 
retribution has two modes, the realistic and the representative. 
The origin of the realistic mode is to be found in Augustine.4 
3 Miley, loc. £11. 
4 William G. T. Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine 
{New York: Charles Scribner, 1863), II, p. 79. 
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However, it was more clearly developed by Anselm.5 In its 
final form, as it appears today, it is an umvarranted extension 
of the forme of philosophical thought into anthropology. 
According to moderate realism the universal essence exists in 
the particular members of a species. However, this universal 
essence is not such a real spiritual and material substance as 
is the individual human being. Guilt can only be associated 
with a person.6 It is unreasonable to consider an essence 
guilty. To Miley, the guilt of Adam 1 s sin was purely personal 
to Adam and could no more become the guilt,of a generic nature 
than any other non-personal being, such as the hand, could 
become guilty of the crime committed by its owner. 
The representative mode involves a legal oneness of the 
race in Adam. This legal oneness is based on the theory that 
God instituted a covenant with Adam in which he became the 
federal head and representative of his race and in which 
capacity he sinned and thus the whole race became involved in 
the guilt.7 This sharing of the guilt is not the result of 
an actual sharing of the sin but becomes the possession of 
Adam 1 s descendants by imputation. Neither the act nor the 
demerit of Adam 1 s sin is imputed, only the gull t as an 
amenability to punishment is imputed by a judicial act of God. 
5 Ibid., p. 118. 
6 Miley, .Qp_. 
_ill. ' p • 488. 
7 Ibid., pp. 493-94. 
The early Calvinistic theologians blurred the two modes into 
one. The1ater Calvinists, such as Charles Hodge, presented 
very clearly defined views of the representative mode. To 
the arguments put forth in support of the representative 
theory Miley could not consent. These arguments were based 
on the principle of responsibility from representation. The 
minister binds the state, the parent the child. Such 
relations are providential relations. The relation of Adam 
to his descendants is such a providential relation, and hence 
the actions of Adam, in his capacity as a representative of 
the race, became binding on the race. To Miley these arguments 
could not be sustained. Neither guilt nor penalty is 
involved in the situations purported to be analogous. Before 
the law the father may have some responsibilities for the son, 
but under no circumstance is guilt imputed to the one or the 
other because of the deed of one. Civil law does not 
recognize such imputation.g 
To Miley both the realistic and the representative 
modes came short of being established by sufficient proof. 
The Biblical references put forth to establish the unity of 
guilt, to him, did not clearly indicate such validity of 
interpretation. Hodge9 had used such Scripture references. 
·· g 'Charles Hodge Systemati.£. Theology (New York: 
Charles Scribner, 1g71~, II, PP• 337-38. 
9 Ibid. I pp. lg9, 5g2. 
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Miley regarded the suffering of the children of criminals to 
be consequence e~d not penalty.lO It would be impossible for 
God to restrict consequences to personal demerit. Human 
society is too involved. It was for corrective ends, as a 
severe wa.rning to people to abstEtin from sin because of its 
drastic consequences, that God so ordered the suffering of 
innocents. 
The classical text in anthropology is that God 11 will 
by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the 
fathers upon the children, and upon the children 1 s children, 
unto the third and fourth generation.nll Wesley had 
interpreted this text to refer especially to the sin of 
idolatry. Very drastic measures were required to restrain 
the people from idolatry. 
II. Afu~INIAN TREATMENT OF ORIGINAL SIN 
So important to Miley was the problem of clearing up 
the inconsistencies of Arminian anthropology that he gave a 
second treatment of the subject in the appendix to the second 
volume of his main theological work. In this study Miley 
surveyed briefly, but pertinently, the views held by the older 
Arminians on the topic of gull t associated t-Ii th native 
depravity. 
10 Miley, QQ. cit., p. 497· 
11 Ibid.> p. 49g. 
According to Arminius, the whole of the original sin 
is common to the entire race who at the time of Adam's 
transgression were in his loins. He referred to Romans 5:12 
as conclusive that all have sinned in Adam. Also he referred 
to Ephesians 2:3, where all men 11 are by nature the children 
of wrath 11 and are subject to temporal as well as eternal 
death. This guilt would remain upon all unless they were 
redeemed by Christ 1 s atonement. According to this view, all 
men are sharers in the guilt of Adam 8s personal sin, and this 
guilt is the judicial ground not only of the corruption of 
nature or spiritual death in which we are born, but also of 
our native amenability to the penalty of temporal and eternal 
death.1 2 Arminius regarded the native depra.vity which 
entailed spiritual, temporal, and eternal death, as being in 
itself a penalty and thus not requiring that it entail 
demerit.. Arminius, in regarding the race as existing in the 
loins of Adem, adhered to the realistic mode of the 
transmission of native depravity. 
Wesley adhered essentially to the same views on 
original sin as Arminius. He regarded e~l men as being 
punished for the sin of Adam by death. He argued from this 
premise: that if all men were punished by God they were justly 
punished, and if they were justly punished they shared in 
Adam 1 s sin. Miley was satisfied that Wesley believed that all 
12 Miley, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, p. 505. 
men shared in Adam 1 s guilt and are justly amenable to its 
punishment. 1 3 
Fletcher 1vas in accord with Armin ius and Wesley on 
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this subject. He held to the doctrine of the common guilt of 
the race through Adam. This judgment Miley derived from the 
place which Fletcher gave to the atonement of Christ as 
taking away the guilt of native depravity. The grace of the 
atonement is universal. Fletcher expressed it thus: 
It follows that as Adam brought a general condemnation 
and a universal seed of death upon all infants, so Christ 
brings upon them a general justification and a universal 
seed of life. And if Adam's original sin was atoned for 
and forgiven him, as the Calvinists, I think, generally 
grant, does it not follow that, although all infants are 
by nature children of wrath, yet through the redemption 
of Christ they are in a state of favor or justification? 
For how could God damn to all eternity any of Adam's 
children for a sin which Christ expiated--a sin which was 
forgiven almost six thousand years ago to Adam, who 
committed it in person? The force of this observation 
would strike our Calvinist brethren if they considered 
that we were not less in Adam 1 s loins TFJhen God gave his 
Son to Adam in the grand, original gospel promise, than 
i'Jhen Eve prevailed on him to eat of the forbidden fruit • 
• • • Thus, if we all received an unspeakable injury by 
being seminally in Adam when he fell, according to the 
first covenant, we all received also an unspeakable 
blessing by being in his loins when God s£¢ritually raised 
him up and placed him upon gospel ground. 
Watson, who to Miley represented the most honored name 
among systematic theologians, a~so conceded the ground to 
Calvinism on this same point. He regarded the human race as 
such a unit that all men were involved in the guil-t of Adam 1 s 
13 Ibid. I p. 506. 
14 Ibid., p. 507. 
original sin. Watson expressed it as follows: 
The circumstances of the case infallibly show that, in 
the whole transaction, they (Adam and Evel stood before 
their Maker as public persons and as the legal 
representatives of their descendants, though if5so many words they are not invested with these titles. 
To Watson the guilt of sin and amenability to 
punishment we,s imputed to Adam 1 s descendants. \'lat son 1 s theory 
of imputation coincided almost exactly with the view held on 
the same subject by Calvinist theologians contemporary with 
Miley. 
Pope, another English Methodist theologian, contemporary 
with Miley, adhered to a common hereditary guilt. He had 
three grounds on which he based this guilt: (1) the g~ound of 
a real oneness with Adam; (2) the ground of a representative 
oneness; and (3) the ground of intrinsic sinfulness of the 
depravity of nature inherited from Adam. 16 According to 
Miley, these views could neither be reconciled with each other 
nor with the determining principles of Arminianism. 17 As 
noted before in this study the first two modes of transmission 
of guilt ccncel each other. 
Summers rejected both the realistic mode and the 
representative mode but he found no real solution to the 
problem for he made the transmission of guilt one of imputation. 
---r-5 ibid. 1 P• 50go 
16 Ibid., pp. 50g-09. 
17 Ibid.) p. 511. 
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Thus 1 in the list of Arminian theologians which he brought to 
his study, Miley found in none of them a solution to the 
problem. They all had conceded ground to Calvinism. Miley 
saw clearly that if universal gull t could be established for 
the original sin of Adam then God is justified in sending all 
men to perdition. If God chooses to exempt some men from 
this fate he may do so with justice. Good gifts may be 
dispensed with at ltlill according to the pleasure of the giver. 
Penalty may only be dispensed with according to guilt in the 
person to whom it is given. These principles are universally 
recognized as basic to the laws of crime and punishment. 
Miley recognized clearly that if the Arminian 
soteriology was to have a solid basis it must clarify its 
anthropology. The traditional anthropology of Augustine did 
not match the soteriology developed by Arminius, Grotius, 
Wesley, and Watson. 
Miley in rejecting any sort of transmission or 
imputation of the guilt of AdeE to his descendants clarified 
and made consistent Arminian anthropology and cleared it of 
all concessions to the Calvinistic system. This rectified 
anthropology matches the conclusions of traditional Arminian 
soteriology. Though the evaluation of Miley's contribution 
to Arminian theology has been reserved for the concluding 
chapter: it has been pertinent to note here that this 
accomplishment of Miley, in clarifying Arminian anthropology, 




I. THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT 
Histori~l background. The development of systematic 
soteriology was a late development in the history of doctrine. 
Though Augustinel had developed a systematic ~thropology his 
notions of the atonement were crude. He accepted the odd 
notion tha t the atonement is a payment made by God to Satan. 
Anselm living in the eleventh century was the first systematic 
soteriologist. The earliest treatment of the atonement had 
consisted of Scriptural statements vlithout any attempt at 
doctrinal formation. The early doctrines which were developed 
were so crude, false, and inadequate that nothing could be 
developed from them. In the history of doctrine Anselm st ands, 
in relation to soteriology, in the position in which Augustine 
stands to anthropology. Anselm2 formulated the doctrine of 
the atonement which became acceptable to the theologies of the 
Reformation. He formulated what to him were basic principles 
from which a theory of the atonement could be constructed. 
These principles were: (1) sin is the withholding from God 
His rightful claim, and therefore is to Him, on account of 
1 Shedd, Histor~ of Christian Doctrine, II, pp . 253-54. 
2 Ibid., p. 275. 
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His character, an infinite wrong. (2) The sinner is thus 
brought to an infinite indebtedness to the Divine honor; (3) 
this debt must be paid. (4) God must not and cannot surrender 
his own personal honor, as he would do in a mere gratuitous 
forgiveness. (5) The sinner never can, by any personal 
conduct, satisfy this claim; (6) therefore, he must suffer 
the full punishment of his sins, or, as the only alternative, 
satisfaction must be rendered by another. (7) It follows 
that the only salvation is through the compensating service 
of a divine mediator. (8) In this exigency the Son of God, 
in compassion for perishing sinners, was incarna ted in their 
nature and on their behalf gave himself up in holy obedience 
and suffering to the Father. Because of his theanthropic 
cliaracter his obedience and death are in full compensation to 
the violated honor of God, and therefore, a true and 
sufficient ground of forgiveness.3 Upon the principles of 
Anselm the theory of satisfaction has been developed. 
William G. T. Shedd~ in his history of doctrine, regarded 
Anselm as a man born out of his time, for he belongs, in his 
thinking, with the Reformation group. The theologians who 
appeared le.t er, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries fell 
short of Anselm in their soteriology. The doctrines of such 
eminent scholastics as Scotus and Aquinas came far short of an 
3 Miley, S1stematic Theo1Qgl 1 Vol. 2, pp . 108-09. 
4 Shedd, QQ. cit., p. 273. 
evangelical development in their treatment of the doctrine of 
sot eriology. 
Though Anselm has been regarded by the Calvinists as 
having originated the theory of satisfaction, strictly speaking 
his theory of the atonement was not the satisfaction theory 
as held by the Calvinists. The substitutive office of the 
active obedience of Christ was not in his doctrine.5 Anselm 
discriminated between punishment and satisfaction. To Miley6 
the doctrine of atonement, as developed by Anselm, was very 
different from the doctrine of satisfaction. Miley regarded 
only two theories of the atonement as worthy of detailed study. 
He gave the bulk of his attention to the satisfaction and the 
governmental theories. 
The satisfaction theory of the atonement. Miley was 
careful to delineate the development of the satisfaction 
theory of atonement as a conscious effort to make it fit a 
workable doctrine, able to fit the needs of the Calvinistic 
system. This system required a finished salvation in Christ. 
As man's sins were imputed to Christ so Christ 1 s obedience 
could be imputed to man. With the Calvinists there are two 
factors in the atonement: (1} substituted punishment; and (2) 
substituted obedience. As man could not atone for his own 
5 Miley, ..Q.R• .£.1.1., p. lOS. 
6 Ibid. I pp. lOS-09. 
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sins but required a more potent substitute so also he is 
unable to fulfill the requirement of obedience. The obedience 
of Christ his substitute is imputed to him. This is the 
atonement of satisfaction. Christ took the place of the elect 
in both penalty and precept, and as their substitute, endured 
the punishment which, on account of sin, they deserve, and in 
his obedience satisfied the righteousness required of them. 
So justice and law are satisfied. The vicarious punishment 
dismissed the elect from the amenability to penalty on account 
of their sin, and Christ's vicarious obedience made them 
deservably rewardable with the eternal blessedness to which 
they have been predestined.7 
Though the core of the satisfaction theory is the 
satisfaction in the punishment of sin according to its merit, 
and solely for that reason, there are also included incidental 
aspects of the theory such as the moral influence exerted and 
the governing rectoral office. The principle fact however is 
that Christ takes the place of elect sinners before the law, 
and suffers in their place the penalty of which they are 
guilty and which suffering satisfies the demands of punitive 
justice. 
Miley considered three forms of substitution: (1) in 
identical penalty; (2) in equal penalty; (3) in ·equivalent 
penalty. The first form has been largely discarded by 
7 Ibid. , p. 134. 
Calvinist theologians. Its difficulties were too numerous 
for it to long command serious consideration. The main 
difficulty was that it was psychologically impossible. How 
could the sufferings of a finite being, enduring for eternity, 
be made identical \<Tith the sufferings of Christ for a short 
duration. 
The second form in equal penalty has also been largely 
discarded. It equated the sufferings of Christ with all the 
sufferings the redeemed would have endured. Miley regarded 
it too low an opinion to merit consideration. 
The last form is the one which has gained recognition 
and acceptance. It holds that the superior rank of Christ, 
as substitute in penalty, is sufficient to pay the penalty of 
all men 1 s sins. The Ca~vinists in using this form would 
restrict it to include only the sins of the elect. 
Miley pointed out that atonement by substitution was 
not a basic part of the sati sfa.ct ion theory alone, but that it 
was also a basic part of the governmental theory. There are 
many besides Calvinists l!fho hold that such a penal substitution 
constitutes a really conditional ground of forgiveness. To 
this group the redemptive sufferings were the punishment of 
sin, but not such a punishment that the redeemed sinner must 
in very justice be discharged. 
Penal substitution ano_ a real conditiona.lity of 
forgiveness must refuse scientific fellowship. We accept, 
therefore the view of Dr. A. A. Hodge, that it is 1by a 
happy sacrifice of logic 1 that Arminius himself, and some 
of his leading followers e.re with the Calvinists on penal 
substitution; only we reject the epithet qualifying the 
sacrifice. We do not think it a happy sacrifice of logic 
on the part of an Arminian 1 whereby he mistakes the true 
nature of the atonement, and at the same time admits a 
principle that requires him, in consistency, to accept 
along with it the purely distinctive doctrines of 
Calvinism. But whatever the sacrifice of logic in the 
case, the fact of such a theory re..lllains the same, and this 
fact denies to the doctrine of satisfacjion the 
distinctive fact of penal substitution. 
An absolute penal substitution remains the unique 
possession of Calvinism. This absolute penal substitution 
gives to all for whom it is a substitute an unconditional 
discharge of penalty for sin. 
Miley posited four chief principles for the theory of 
satisfaction: (1} the demerit of sin; (2) a divine punitive 
justice; (3) sin ought to be punished; and (4) penal 
satisfaction is a necessity of justice. The first two 
principles Miley readily accepted as consistent with a strict 
satisfaction theory. The last two principles, to Miley, 
could not be held by a strict satisfaction theory but burst 
open the way into the governmental theory. God, of necessity, 
as a. moral ruler must punish sin by direct punishment or by 
accepting ~m appropriate substitute for the sinner. In the 
strict bounds of the satisfaction theory this obligation to 
punish must be maintained simply on the ground of the demerit 
of sin. This, to Miley, was untenable and burst the bounds of 
the satisfaction theory, giving way to the governmental theory. 
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From the nature of injustice the punishment of sin is 
necessary. The obligation is such that any omission of 
punishment would be an act of injustice. Thus from the 
very nature of divine justice, the necessary punishment 
of sin is deduced as a consequence. It is as essential 
and immutable in God as any other attribute; therefore he 
must punish sin according to its desert and upon that 
ground. Thus his justice binds him to the infliction of 
merited punishment upon sin, just as other moral 
perfections bind him to holiness, goodness, and truth.9 
To Miley it was because the punishment of sin is a 
necessity in the rectitude of Divine justice that the only 
possible atonement is by penal substitution. A thorough-
going satisfaction theory could not allow for penal substitution. 
Does the penal substitution maintained fulfill the alleged 
absolute oblijation of justice to punish sin according to its 
demerit? There is no such answer or fulfillment.l0 In going 
on 't-lith his argument to support his position that the 
satisfaction theory is inadequate, Miley contended that 
nothing could be punished in Christ which was not transferred 
to him, and in some real sense made his. This to him was 
self-evident. If sin with its demerit could not be put upon 
Christ by imputation, no punishment which he suffered fell 
upon such demerit, or intrinsic evil of sin. It is impossible 
to show how sin is punished according to its demerit in the 
total absence of such demerit from the substitute in 
punishment. With the omission of the theory, its only 
9 Ibid. I P· 143. 
10 Ibid. , p. 145. 
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recourse is in guilt as a distinct fact of sin. If guilt, as 
the amenability of sin to the penalty of justice, is separable 
from sin, and as a distinct fact transferable to Christ, and 
if his punishment is the punishment of sin according to its 
demerit and on that ground, then the penal substitution 
maintained answers to the asserted absolute necessity for the 
punishment of sin. If any one of these suppositions fails 
the theory, then the theory itself inevitably fails. 11 Thus, 
Miley presented the crux of the matter. He then pointed out 
that guilt could not be separated from sin. Sin is not an 
impersonal something but is closely associated with a person. 
The person, in the last analysis, is what is punishable. To 
fulfill the requirement of a strict satisfaction theory Christ 
must be identified with all the guilt and demerit which the 
sinner possesses. It of necessity follows that Christ must 
be deserving of punishment, an utterly repulsive thought. 
The strict satisfaction theory ushers squarely into the 
main tenets of Calvinism. Miley referred to Charles Hodge 
from whom he derived the following quotation. 
If the claims of justice are satisfied they cannot be 
again enforced. This is the analogy between the work of 
Christ and the payment of a debt. The point of agreement 
between the two cases is not the nature of the satisfa ction 
rendered, but one aspect of the effect produced. In both 
cases the persons for whom the satisfa ction is made are 
certainly freed. Their exemption of deliverance is in both 
cases, and equally in both, a matter of justice.l2 
11 Ibid. I p. 146. 
12 Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, p. 472. 
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Dick, another Calvinist theologian , quoted by Miley, 
took the same line of argument a s did Hodge, to the effect 
that God would not punish sin twice, first in Christ and then 
in the sinner.l3 In quoting from several other Calvinist 
theologians the chorus was strength ened to the effect that 
for those for whom Christ died there could be no more 
condemna.tion for sin a s the price had been paid once and for 
all. 
To Miley, this conclusion, which the satisfaction 
theory rea ches in Calvinism, wa s a logical consequence which 
could have been predicted from the principles held on the 
theory. To him the reason for entering into the argument and 
bringing into it the quotations from the Calvinist theologians 
was to make the issue so clea r as to silence all cavil. 
The government al theory of the atonement. The 
governmental theory gives room for the substitutional 
a tonement, for conditionality of the atonement, and for 
substitution in suffering. To Miley the suffering s of Christ 
were an atonement for sin by substitution, in the sense that 
they were intentionally endured for sinners under the judicial 
condemnation, and for the sake of the forgiveness. The 
Scriptures are plain on the conditionality of the forgiveness 
of sin. The placing of the substitution of Christ in 
13 Miley, QQ· cit., p. 151. 
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suffering 1 rather than in penalty, finished the break of 
Miley 1 s soteriology with the satisfaction theory as developed 
by the Calvinists. 
The substitution, therefore, is in suffering, without 
the penal element. This agrees with the nature of the 
atonement as a moral support of justice in its rectoral 
office, thus rendering forgiveness consistent with the 
interest of moral government.l~ 
Miley contended that the vicarious sufferings of Christ 
did not lose in value without the penal element. It was the 
same efficacious sacrifice manifesting the same love. 
Yet without the penal element in the suffering of 
Christ, we may attribute to them a peculiar depth and cast 
arising out of their relation to sin in their redemptive 
office, and find the explanation in the facts of psychology.l5 
Hodge had urged that penal substitution is necessary, 
not only for the satisfaction of justice, but also for 
satisfying the demands of a guilty conscience, which mere 
pardon can never appease. Miley fully accepted the fact of a 
deep sense of punitive demerit because of sin in an awakened 
conscience, but to him relief to conscience comes in the 
knowledge that one 1 s sins are forgiven. 
The governmental theory, though it had its origin with 
Grotius, became identified as the New England theory and as 
the Edwardian theory, after the son of Jonathan Edwards who 
contributed to its formation. Though Watson dealt extensively 
14 Ibid., p. 156. 
15 Ibid., P• 157. 
with the governmental theory his discussion was mainly a 
dispute with the Socinien heresy and with Calvinism. With 
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the former he desired to establish the fact that there was an 
atonement and with the latter he desired to prove the 
universality of the atonement. Watson, to :Miley, represented 
the most worthy Arminian systematic theologian. He aspired 
therefore, if possible, to improve upon the work of Watson 
for he know that the one who could do that 'tvould make a real 
contribution to systematic theology. Miley corrected Watson 
on his anthropology, and he also found it necessary to correct 
him on his soteriology. Miley recognized the service l'rhich 
Watson had given in refuting the Socinian heresy and in his 
soteriological polemics with Calvinism, but, aside from this, 
he did not regard \vat son 1 s t>Jork in soteriology as clear or as 
contributing a great deal to Arminian theology. Watson had 
been greatly indebted to Grotius on this topic. Grotius 
though he had originated the governmental theory had not given 
it a thorough, scientific treatment. Grotius, who had started 
out as a. Reformed theologian, in turning to the Arminian 
theology, still maintained the Calvinistic approach to the 
subject of the atonement. Therefore, Grotius 1 treatment of 
the governmental theory of the atonement did not receive full 
development. Watson, according to Miley, did no better by the 
subject than Grotius himself. This important subject was left 
ifli thout _tho_rough scientific treatment until a man able enough 
for the task appeared upon the scene. The man recognizing 
the problem and at the same time possessing the ability to 
give it scientific treatment proved to be Miley himself. 
Pope, Foster, and Ralston all failed to tackle the problem, 
whether from failure to recognize it or from lack of ability 
to solve it no one knows. Tha t Miley early recognized the 
import ance of t h e problem of soteriology is proved by the 
fact that his first well-known work in theology was a work on 
the atonement. His systematic theology was but an expansion 
on this w·ork which went intact into his work on systematic 
theology. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION 
Under the benefits of the a tonement only the topic of 
entire sanctification has been treated in this study. The 
other topics were not eliminated because they were 
unimportant, bu t because they were less pertinent to this 
study. This thesis, of necessity, has been very limited in the 
material handled. The top ics of justification, regeneration, 
and assurance have reached a rela t ively large degree of 
agreement among evangelical theologians. The topic of 
sanctification has been a theological storm center, and 
therefore an important subject for consideration in this 
study. Did Foster and Miley add anything to the thought of 
Wesley , Fletcher, and Watson? The doctrine of entire 
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sanctification was a specialty with John Wesley. He gave it 
thorough consideration. Fletcher and Watson follm~ed closely 
in the steps of \'lesley and used him as the supreme authority 
on the subject. The t h eologians in America were farther removed 
from the personal influence of Wesley. With an opportunity to 
give the subject a more objective treatment did they contribute 
anything to the material bequeathed to them by their 
predecessors'? Did they find errors and inconsistencies in the 
doctrine? 
To both Foster and Miley there was a problem concerning 
the sin which remains after regeneration. 
I find evidences of obscurity in all the writings about 
it. The most eminent divines are not clear. They all 
agree in the fact; but when they attempt to explain they 
become confused. The difficulty is to make plain what 
that sin is, from which Christian men are not free, which 
remains in, or is found still cleaving to believers; how 
to discriminate between the same sin tha t is removed in 
regeneration and the se~e sin that remains. And it is 
just around this point that revolves the whole question of 
entire sanctification, both as to what it is and its 
possibility. It has to do with that sin that remains. 
It removes that remainder of sin.lb 
The above quotation from Foster was seized upon by Miley, as 
expressing his own problem in regard to the same question. 
Though both Foster and Miley recognized the import8.nce o-f this 
problem they had different solutions for it. Foster 
differentiated between the sin removed in regeneration and 
that removed in entire sanctification as actual sin entailing 
i6 Randolph S. Foster, Christian Purit~ (New York: Eaton 
and Mains, 1S97), p. 117. 
guilt for the former and inherited depravity, not entailing 
guilt, for the latter. To Miley there v.Tas no such easy 
solution. 
Miley found the problem of the remaining sin defiant 
to exact explanation. He did not regard this remaining sin 
as identical with native depravity, because regeneration 
accomplished different results in the hearts of people. 
The question of a remnant of depravity is not without 
perplexity. As the na ture of depravity as a whole is 
difficult for thought, so tha t of a remnant not different 
in kind from the whole is difficult. Consequently, t~~re 
is perplexity in the notion of entire sanctification. r 
Miley later continued: 
However, as the truth of native depravity is not 
conditioned in a capacity in us fully to apprehend it, or 
clearly interpret it in thought , so the truth of a remnant 
of depravity after regeneration is not so conditioned. In 
each case t h e inner state may be known t hDough its 
activities, a s manifest in our consciousness . There is 
another mode of information. By the observation of others, 
as to their tempers, words, and acts, \ve gain an insight 
into their inner nature, and may thus know its 
characteristic tendencies, whether to the good or evil.lg 
Though Scripture, according to Miley, does not make 
explicit statements on the incompl eteness of regeneration yet 
enough is given so that a sure basis can be found for . the 
doctrine in Scripture. Though experience testifies of 
remaining sin yet Miley would not consider basing a doctrine 
upon experience. Experience to him should never be used as a 
17 Miley, QQ. cit., p. 35g. 
lg Ibid., p. 359· 
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source of doctrine but only to confirm doctrine. 
In regard to the mode of the inner work of sanctification 
Miley did not believe that perfect clarity was possible. He 
regarded Foster's work on the topic as clearly holding the 
view of repression. On examining the work of Foster at this 
point, it has been impossible to agree with Miley on this 
judgment. Belo'tv is a quotation from Foster, taken from the 
page marked, by Miley, as pertinent on this point. 
It may be well to explain here, more particularly, 
both with respect to the natural dispositions and 
propensities. These are not supposed to be destroyed when 
a soul is entirely freed from sin, but only brought under 
right government and restored to a proper character--not 
allowed to be instruments of sin. Evil dispositions and 
propensitites are but perverted forms of good ones, and 
hence, holiness or sanctification consists not in the 
eradication of them, but in the restoration of them to 
their legitimate character and use.l9 
If the propensities and impulses are rectified what is 
repressed? 
That Miley regarded his own view, as well as Foster 1 s 
and Whedon's, as favoring repression was unfortunate, because 
it did not give as clear a final statement to the problem of 
the mode of cleansing as it is possible to give. Certainly 
evil is no real being that may be cut out as a surgeon cuts 
out a tumor or a cancer, neither is it something to be 
repressed. The human nature may be governed by pure motives, 
pure desires. What takes place in entire sanctification is 
19 Foster, QQ. cit., p. 74. 
the purification of motive and desire. Neither the terms 
eradication nor repression are suitable for explaining what 
takes place. 
On the possibility of holiness in this life, that is 
a second work of grace, that the doctrine has a basis in 
Scripture, and that it is obtainable by faith, Foster and 
Miley were in agreement with the British theologians. 
CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
I. EVALUATION 
Evaluation of Foster's contribution. Foster made a 
contribution to Wesleyan-Arminian t h eology in h is elaboration 
of the philosophical basis to that theology. Though he never 
mentioned the name of Aristotle he lined his thinking squarely 
with the metaphy s ics of Aristotle. \·lesley himself, though he 
gave references to the importance of maintaining Aristotle's 
logic, never worked out a philosophical basis to theology. 
Watson clearly presented the problem of causality in 
relation to proving the existence of God. 1 He recognized the 
power of the ~ posteriori proofs. He also clearly showed how 
Divine revel a tion had aided the human reason in arriving at a 
first cause. The tendency of the pagan mind had been to 
regard matter a s eternal and thus involve an eternal 
succession of causes and effects. To Watson, the rational 
proofs, by themselves, might never have arrived at a clear 
notion of a first cause, but in collaboration with Divinely 
revealed truth in regard to God they became an impregnable 
wall against the arguments of Atheism. 2 
~d Watson, Theological Institutes (Ne't..r York: 
Philips and Hunt, 1850), I, p. 276. 
2 Ibid. , pp . 273 ff. 
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Watson did not ground the arguments for God 1 s. existence 
in a metaphysical basis. Foster did . Consequently, he gave 
to the subject a thorough treatment such as it had never before 
been given in the Wesleyan tradition. Miley dismissed the 
philosophical approach completely, believing the basis of 
theology to be scientific.3 He did not recognize that science 
ha~ a philosophical basis. Foster however, had an answer to 
the problem of the eternity of matter which Watson had ·not 
seen. 11 The adjustment of matter rather than its creation, 
furnishes the best proof of the divine existence. 114 No 
Wesleyan theologian has been as concerned with the subject of 
rational theology as was Foster. 
Foster's liberal interpretation of the inspiration of 
Scripture left him vulnerable on a very important issue. 
This placed him on the debit side of the ledger in his 
contribution to Arminian theology. In his evaluation of the 
Bible he st arted from the premise 11 that what is important is, 
that the Bible be true as a whole and in every part. 11 Untruth 
alone could put it in peril. Thus Foster took a rational 
approach to the subject without taking the statements of 
Scripture upon the subject of its inspiration. It may have 
been tha t Foster, if given the opportunity to explain himself 
in grea ter det ail, 1.;rould have assured us that his conception 
3 Miley, Systematic Theology, Vol. l, pp. 22 ff. 
4 Foster, Theism, p. 90. 
of the inspiration of Scripture was not liberal after all. 
It was the first tentative conclusion of this study that 
perhaps Foster had simply inverted the terms of inspiration 
and revela.t ion. However, on further study, this tentative 
conclusion could not be maintained. The term inspiration, as 
applied to Scripture, is purely a Biblical term and has no 
definition apart from its usage in Scripture. It is a term 
that defies exact definition. What the term implies in the 
manner or method by which Scripture became inspired could not 
be determined. Historically, the problem of the inspira.tion 
of the Scriptures did not receive elaborate treatment until 
the seventeenth century when theories regarding the manner of 
inspiration were developed. 5 
The early church fathers had no theories as to the 
inspiration of the Scriptures.6 Augustine did not regard the 
truth of Scripture as bound to the words but believed the 
thought was the important thing] None of the great reformers 
ma.intained a verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. g These 
reformers, however, spoke in the strongest terms of the 
divinity, credibility, and infallibility of the sacred 
5 John M 1Clintock and James Strong, 11 Inspira.tion, 11 
Cyclopedia of Biplical, Theolo~ical, and Ecclesiastical 
Literature, IV, o15. 
6 Ibid. I p. 614. 
7 Ibid. I p. 615. 
g Loc. cit. 
,.,ritings. The most influential men, in their utterances on 
the inspiration of Scripture, treated it very simply. 
Would Foster, if pressed, have spoken in strong 
language of the divinity, credibility, and infallibility of 
the Scriptures? There is no clue in the Prolegomena that he 
would have done so. In regard to the truthfulness of the 
Bible Foster wrote: 
To its truthfulness it is not necessary that it should 
be inspired in every part, unless it can be shovm that it 
assumes that it is so inspired, or necessarily implies it. 
This cannot be shown, nor is it in any way important to 
be assumed; while, on many accounts, and for truth 1 s sake 
especially, it may be importa.nt that it should not be 
assumed. 9 
The strongest point of emphasis, to Foster, l'la.s the 
truthfulness of Scripture. It may ha.ve been argued that since 
no human mind unaided by Divine influence could be one hundred 
percent accurate in its statements, entire truthfulness 
implies Divine influence and consequently the entire Bible is 
divinely inspired. If this was the argument of Foster he 
gave no indication of it. 
The evaluation of Foster's contribution to the doctrine 
of entire sanctification is largely based upon Miley's regard 
for Foster 1 s Christian Purity. Miley made few references to 
the writings of Foster. However 1 in his treatment of the 
doctrine of entire sanctification, he used Foster's Christian 
Purity as a basic work. Miley regarded Foster 1 s emphasis upon 
9 Foster, Prolegomena, p. 279. 
the problem of the remaining sin after regeneration to be 
pertinent. Foster and Miley found different solutions to 
this problem. It has been the judgment of this study that 
Miley's solution to the problem was preferable to that of 
Foster. Foster's presentation of the subject was true to the 
Wesleyan tradition throughout. It clearly presented the 
cardinal points of the doctrine of entire sanctification: an 
; 
instantaneous work of grace subsequent to the work of 
regeneration; obtainable by faith; the heart made perfect in 
love. 
Evaluation of l'Uley 1 s contribution. Miley saw ti<JO 
things that remained undone in Wesleyan-Arminian theology. 
He saw the need of clarifying both its anthropology and its 
soteriology. The problem of evaluating the contribution of 
Miley lies in the judgment of Miley's work on these two 
subjects. Were his solutions and corrections valid? It has 
been the conclusion of this study that the corrections which 
Miley made to Arminian anthropology and soteriology were 
valid. Miley, by removing inherited guilt from anthropology, 
has both given a clearer view of the justice of God and 
removed the last leg that could uphold the Calvinistic system. 
It has made Arminian anthropology thoroughly consistent with 
itself. His treatment of soteriology has exalted the 
conception of the atonement. There is, in his treatment, no 
calculus of suffering whereby Christ's sufferings pay in full 
the price of sufferings which elect men otherwise 'tiJould have 
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endured, thus releasing them forever from condemnation. From 
the hand of Miley the atonement emerged free from the last 
vestige of penal substitution. Christ in love suffered in 
man's place. In no sense did He become guilty in taking 
man's place. This utterly repugnant notion that Christ 
actually became sin in order to atone for sin was refuted by 
Miley. 10 With the removal of penal substitution and the 
imputation of man's guilt on Christ the props of the Calvinist 
system are removed. Miley's anthropology and soteriology 
gave the strongest argument from the Arminian side which had 
been presented in opposition to the Calvinist system. 
Miley aspired to clarify the work of Watson whom he 
regarded as the top systematic theologian in the tradition. 
He realized that the one who could clarify and correct Watson 
would make a real contribution to Wesleys.n theology. It has 
been the conclusion of ~his study that Miley did clarify and 
correct the work of Watson and therefore made a real 
contribution to Wesleyan theology. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The real purpose of this study has been to delineate 
the main current of Wesleyan-Arminian theology. The best 
method of accomplishing this objective seemed to be to limit 
the study to the most influential works in the movement. It 
may have seemed that the selection was an arbitrary one. 
However there were only a few choices possible. No one would 
seriously question the place of influence which theological 
schools like Boston University or Drew Theological Seminary 
have had in the Wesleyan movement. It "toras the chair of 
theology at Drew which led in the argument against the Calvinism 
of Charles Hodge. Time has caused the influence of both 
Foster and Miley, at Drew, to loom large. The theology of 
Miley has not yet been transcended. The theologian who makes 
a real contribution to the Wesleyan tradition must do so. 
It has been the pu~pose of this study to compare 
Foster and Miley with Wesley, Watson, and Pope. In comparing 
Miley's treatment of anthropology and soteriology with the 
treatment given these subjects by Wesley, Watson, and Pope, 
it l.vas discovered that Miley had already, in the development 
of these topics, made copious references and comparisons, 
along with many quotations, to the three named theologians. 
What was vitally pertinent in the writings of the three men 
he had already appropriated to his study. Thus the comparisons 
were before the eyes in studying r.aley. The same situation 
was encountered in studying both Miley and Foster on the 
· subject of entire sanctification. This has considerably 
lessened the impressiveness of the study as fe¥r quotations 
have thus been made from the writing s of the British 
theologians. However, it has facilitated the study. 
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In the matter of the philosophical basis to theology, 
once the subject has been thoroughly worked there is no room 
for advancement in that line. It is impossible to expand a 
basic metaphy~ics. On that subject, thoroughness and clarity 
are the only objectives. There are also doctrines, such as 
the doctrine of the Trinity, Christology, and the relation of 
reason to revelation, which have reached a settled conclusion 
among evangelical theologians. It was the purpose of this 
study to determine if more subjects could not be added to the 
store of those bearing the stamp of settled agreement, among 
at least the Arminian theologians. In determining the progress 
made by · a theological tradition settled agreement is the chief 
concern. In determining the progress made by the Wesleyan 
tradition, the thorough-going work of Foster in the 
philosophical basis to theology should be added. The work of 
Miley in anthropology and sot eriology should also be added to 
this fund of settled doctrines. To back down from the 
conclusions presented by these two men on the above named 
subjects would mean retrogression. 
It is as necessary to remain loyal to a doctrine once 
conclusively established as it is to further develop hitherto 
neglected doctrines. In gaining new ground it is imperative 
to be watchful that no old ground is lost. 
It is the conclusion of this study that the Wesleyan 
theologians in America have advanced and enriched their 
tradition. Their most influential exponents have remained 
loyal to the old tradition. An apostasy common to all the 
great Protestant denominations has, in recent year~, been a 
reason for the retarded development of theology in the line 
of true progress. This defe: ction has, in part, motivated 
this study which has attempted to find the basic pillars upon 
which a sound philosophy and a sound theology rest. 
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